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THE USE OF CLOSED-CIRCUIT TELEVISION
TESTIMONY IN CHILD SEXUAL ABUSE CASES: A
TWENTIETH CENTURY SOLUTION TO A
TWENTIETH CENTURY PROBLEM
In an effort to protect the sexually abused child-witness from the
further trauma of live testimony, the California Legislature re-
cently enacted Penal Code section 1347. This section allows the
use of closed-circuit television to transmit the child witness' testi-
mony to the courtroom from another location. This and similar
statutes have been challenged on several constitutional grounds,
most notably as being a violation of the Confrontation Clause of
the sixth amendment. Questions have also been raised on whether
this procedure violates a defendant's due process rights. This
Comment examines these constitutional .issues and concludes that
Penal Code section 1347 is consistent with the constitutional pro-
tections afforded by the Confrontation and Due Process Clauses.
INTRODUCTION
The incidence of child sexual abuse has been reported with alarm-
ing frequency in recent years.' Though predominantly nonviolent in
nature,2 these crimes often result in serious psychological and emo-
1. See, e.g., Studies Find Sexual Abuse of Children is Widespread, N.Y.
Times, May 13, 1982, at Cl, col. 1, CO, col. 2 (an American Humane Society study
showed a 200% increase in the reporting of sexual abuse from 1976 to 1980); Girdner,
Out of the Mouths of Babes, 5 CAL. LAW., June 1985, at 57, 58 (reports by California's
central child abuse registry show the annual number of reported child abuse cases has
risen ninefold, from 5000 to 45,000 in the past decade); A Hidden Epidemic, NEws-
WEEK, May 14, 1984, at 33 ("[S]omewhere between 100,000 to 500,000 American chil-
dren will be molested this year.").
2. Schultz, Diagnosis and Treatment - Introduction, in THE SEXUAL VIC-
TIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 39, 40 (L. Schultz ed. 1980) (no more than 5% to 10% of sexual
abuse involves physical injury); see also Flammang, Interviewing Child Victims of Sex
Offenders, in THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 175, 177 (L. Schultz ed. 1980) (the
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tional damage to the victimized child.3 Sexual abuse commonly de-
stroys the child's sense of well-being, undermining the basic founda-
tion for healthy growth and development.4 The interests of society
are best served by the unrestrained prosecution of these offenders,
while at the same time, protecting the child from further trauma.'
Convicting offenders frequently is difficult;6 the crime almost al-
ways occurs in secrecyJ leaving the victimized child as the only wit-
ness. 8 The prosecutor's problem is compounded when the offender is
a parent, relative, or an acquaintance of the child.9 The traumatic
nature of the courtroom litigation process'0 is amplified when the
lack of the use of force tends to explain why the suspected abuser often states the child
was not hurt).
3. Fontana, Sexual Child Abuse, in DEALING WITH SEXUAL CHILD ABUSE 1
(Nat'l Comm. for Prevention of Child Abuse 2d ed. 1982); Libai, Protection of the Child
Victim of a Sexual Offense in the Criminal Justice System, 15 WAYNE L. REV. 977,
980-81 (1969).
4. Holtzman, Making the System Work, WORKING WOMAN, Aug., 1984, at 70;
see also Summit, Sexual Child Abuse, the Psychotherapist and the Team Concept, in
DEALING WITH SEXUAL CHILD ABUSE 19 (Nat'l Comm. for Prevention of Child Abuse
2d ed. 1980) (Child sexual abuse "does form the basis of a substantial portion of both
child and adult psychopathology."); V. DE FRANCIS, PROTECTING THE CHILD VICTIM OF
SEX CRIMES COMMITTED BY ADULTS 160 (American Humane Ass'n 1969) (reporting
that 58% of the sexually abused children studied had developed feelings of inferiority and
lack of self-worth).
5. These competing interests can be better reconciled by legislative innovation.
Legislative measures which protect the immediate victim from the additional trauma
inflicted by the judicial process will logically result in more and better witnesses, and a
correspondingly higher conviction rate. One commentator has noted:
To prevent the perpetuation of child abuse, alternatives are needed which ade-
quately address the special needs and abilities of children. Children must be
protected from exposure to the risk of severe emotional trauma and a system
which precludes many child abuse cases from ever reaching the courts . . . .
Many of these cases are never litigated due to the inherent problems in the
current system.
Avery, The Child Abuse Witness: Potential for Secondary Victimization, 7 CRIM. JUST.
J. 1, 47-48 (1983); see also Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prose-
cutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REV. 806, 826 (1985) ("Discourag-
ingly low conviction rates merely confirm what is intuitively clear: that child victims,
even when competent to testify and not removed from the court system by their parents,
make reluctant and undependable witnesses.").
6. Bulkley, The Law and Child Sexual Abuse, in DEALING WITH SEXUAL CHILD
AnUSE 3 (Nat'l Comm. for Prevention of Child Abuse 2d ed. 1982).
7. See Flammang, supra note 2, at 177.
8. Id. at 178; Stevens & Berliner, Special Techniques for Child Witnesses, in
THE SEXUAL VICTIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 246, 248 (L. Schultz ed. 1980).
9. See generally V. DE FRANCIS, supra note 4 (75% of the offenders were a
relative, neighbor or person with whom the child had frequent contact); Sgroi, Sexual
Molestation of Children: The Last Frontier in Child Abuse, in THE SEXUAL VIC-
TIMOLOGY OF YOUTH 25, 29 (L. Schultz ed. 1980) (citing a survey showing the offender
was a parent or parent-substitute in 80% of the cases studied).
10. See Parker, The Rights of Child Witnesses: Is the Court a Protector or Per-
petrator?, 17 NEW ENG. L. REv. 643 (1982); Note, The Young Victim as Witness for
the Prosecution: Another Form of Abuse? 89 DICK. L. REV. 721 (1984); Libai, supra
note 3, at 984. Libai noted:
Psychiatrists have identified components of the legal proceedings that are capa-
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child must confront the assailant again in person11 and relive the
experience by telling the details of the abuse in a public setting. 12 As
a result, the victimized child may refuse to testify or may testify
ineffectively.' 3 When these problems are combined with the routine
lack of medical or physical evidence, 14 and the uncertain competency
or credibility of the child,' 5 a prosecutor is faced with a difficult task
in obtaining a conviction.' The prosecutor is further hindered by the
ble of putting a child victim under prolonged mental stress and endangering his
emotional equilibrium: repeated interrogations and cross-examination; facing
the accused again; the official atmosphere in court; the acquittal of the accused
for want of corroborating evidence to the child's trustworthy testimony; and the
conviction of a molester who is the child's parent or relative.
Id. (citations omitted). Discussing the traumatic nature of testifying from the witness
stand, one judge noted:
Have you ever been up there? . . . It's a strange experience, even for an adult.
Your palms start to sweat as you listen to this guy, and you say, what is he
trying to do to me? The trauma we're proposing to inflict on these kids. . . we
should do all we can to lessen that, consistent with the rights of the accused.
Girdner, supra note 1, at 92 (quoting Fourth District California Court of Appeal Justice
Robert E. Rickles of San Bernardino).
11. See, e.g., L. HOLSTROM & A. BURGESS, THE VIcTINM OF RAPE 163, 226 (1978)
("Some victims reacted visibly to seeing the defendant. One became visibly nervous as
the defendant, his family, and friends came in and sat down behind her in the court-
room."); see also Bowers, Libai's Child Courtroom: Is It Constitutional?, 7 J. Joy. L. 31
(1983). The author stated:
It is common courtroom practice for the defense attorney to try to force the
child to look at the accused by standing beside the defendant during cross-
examination and asking the child questions which forces him or her to look in
that direction. While this experience is often very traumatic, defense attorneys
have been known to use even greater pressure on the child. For example, in one
Riverside County courtroom a twelve year old girl was asked to step down in
front of the jury box and demonstrate the position in which she was forced to
lie while being molested by the accused. While she was demonstrating this po-
sition, the accused, the jury and the spectators watched.
Id. at 34 (emphasis in original).
12. T. MCCAHILL, L. MEYER & A. FISCHMAN, THE AFTERMATH OF RAPE 211
(1979); L. HOLSTROM & A. BURGESS, supra note 11, at 170.
13. See L.A. Daily J., Feb. 3, 1984, at 3, col. 1.
14. See Flammang, supra note 2, at 177. Most sexual acts against children con-
sist of petting, fondling, and oral copulation; none necessarily require the use of physical
violence, thereby leaving the victim physically unscarred, and leaving little medical
evidence.
15. See Bulkley, supra note 6, at 8 (the child's lack of credibility or competency
is often due to "limited cognition or verbal abilities" or "alleged suggestibility"); see also
Avery, supra note 5, at 6-13. Although many commentators attribute children's sus-
pected lack of competency or credibility to their "tendency to fantasize" or their ten-
dency to be "less truthful than adults," studies cited by Avery tend to disprove these
assumptions. One study cited found "little correlation between age and honesty." Avery
also states: "[A child is] unlikely to fantasize about sexual activity because it is not
within the child's realm of experience." Id. at 12.
16. See Bulkley, supra note 6, at 8; Chaze, Now, Nationwide Drive to Curb
reluctance of parents to expose their child to the trauma inherently
part of the legal process. 17
Public awareness of the need to protect victimized child witnesses
from the additional trauma of the legal process is growing.' 8 In re-
sponse, state legislatures have enacted procedures designed to mini-
mize the effects of "legal process trauma." 19 These procedures in-
clude closing the courtroom during the child's testimony,20 creating
Child Abuse, U.S. NEws & WORLD REP., Oct. 1, 1984 at 73.
17. See Note, supra note 5, at 807 ("[P]arents sometimes decline to press
charges rather than subject their abused child to the ordeal of extended litigation requir-
ing endless repetition of a painful and best forgotten episode."); Parker, supra note 10, at
651 ("Many parents, realizing how grueling the criminal process can be, fail to report
sexual assaults in order to protect their children from courtroom trauma."); see also J.
MACDONALD, RAPE OFFENDERS AND THEIR VICTIMS 128 (1971).
18. See generally Avery, supra note 5; Bulkley, Evidentiary and Procedural
Trends In State Legislation and Other Emerging Legal Issues in Child Abuse Cases, 89
DICK. L. REv. 645 (1985); Note, The Testimony of Child Victims in Sex Abuse Prose-
cutions: Two Legislative Innovations, 98 HARV. L. REv. 806 (1985).
19. "Legal process trauma" is the term given by Libai to all damaging psycholog-
ical effects that arise as a result of the child's involvement with the legal system following
the report of the abuse. Included are the effects resulting from interviews by the police,
prosecutor, medical personnel, as well as the effects from testifying during the various
stages of the criminal proceedings. See Libai, supra note 3, at 983. In 1985 the Califor-
nia Legislature enacted Penal Code section 868.8 which set forth, in part, these legisla-
tive findings and declarations:
(a) The Legislature hereby finds and declares that it is necessary to provide
alleged child molestation victims with additional consideration and different
treatment from that which is afforded to adults. The Legislature intends, by
this act, to provide minors under the age of 11 who are alleged sexual offense
victims with certain additional rights and protections during their involvement
with criminal proceedings. The Legislature also urges the news media to use
restraint in revealing the identity of these alleged victims, especially in particu-
larly sensitive cases.
(b) The Legislature further finds and declares that some researchers believe
that the alleged child molestation victim who is required to testify in court may
experience psychological stress in discussing the alleged offense, that tradi-
tional court procedures may fail to take into account the potential damage to
the child witness, that these procedures might exacerbate any damage already
done to the child, and that judges who deal with child molestation cases should
receive training in the psychological and social issues of child molestation, the
basic principles of child protection and development, and techniques that may
make the child more cooperative and thus aid the truth-gathering process.
(c) The Legislature further finds and declares that innovative approaches in the
legal system's handling of alleged child sexual abuse cases should be adopted to
prevent additional trauma to the child. The Legislature finds that some re-
searchers believe that traditional courtroom settings intimidate child witnesses
and thus may hinder the truth-gathering process; that in order to elicit infor-
mation most effectively and to maintain the child's cooperation it may be nec-
essary to create new courtroom configurations, designed to respond to the
child's size, limited capacity to communicate, and special needs for comfort,
support, and reassurance.
1985 Cal. Stat. c. 1174, § 1, p. 1-2.
20. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7 (West 1986) (operative Jan. 1, 1987).
This section allows closure during the testimony of a witness who is:
a minor and the complaining victim of a sex offense, where testimony before
the general public would be likely to cause serious psychological harm to the
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new hearsay exceptions, 21 permitting the use of leading questions
with child witnesses,22 permitting the use of videotape to record the
victimized child's testimony for use at trial,23 and allowing a support
person to offer aid and comfort to the child witness during
testimony.24
California has been a leader in the movement to protect the child
witness, recently enacting Penal Code section 1347 .25 This statute
gives the trial court discretion to allow child testimony via two-way
closed-circuit television (CCTV). CCTV permits contemporaneous
testimony and full cross-examination while keeping the child physi-
cally removed from the courtroom.26 The statute authorizes the use
of CCTV when the victimized child is ten years of age or younger,27
the testimony includes the facts of an alleged sexual offense commit-
ted on or with the child,28 and the court finds, by clear and convinc-
ing evidence, that the impact of one or more enumerated factors is so
substantial as to effectively make the minor unavailable as a
witness.2
9
witness and where no alternative procedures, including, but not limited to,
video taped deposition or contemporaneous examination in another place com-
municated to the courtroom by means of closed-circuit television, are available
to avoid the perceived harm.
See also N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 634-A:8 (Supp. 1981).
21. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9A.44.120 (Supp. 1984).
22. See, e.g., CAL. EVID. CODE § 767(b) (West Supp. 1986).
23. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 1346 (West Supp. 1986); N. M. STAT. ANN. §
30-9-17(a) (Supp. 1984).
24. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.5 (West Supp. 1986).
25. Id. § 1347.
26. Id. § 1347(b).
27. Id.
28. Id. § 1347(b)(1).
29. The enumerated factors are:
(a) Threats of serious bodily injury to be inflicted on the minor or a family
member, of incarceration or deportation of the minor or a family member, or
of removal of the minor from the family or dissolution of the family, in order to
prevent or dissuade the minor from attending or giving testimony at any trial
or court proceeding or to prevent the minor from reporting the alleged sexual
offense or from assisting in criminal prosecution.
(b) Use of a firearm or any other deadly weapon during the commission of the
crime.
(c) Infliction of great bodily injury upon the victim during the commission of
the crime.
(d) Conduct on the part of the defendant or defense counsel during the hearing
or trial which causes the minor to be unable to continue his or her testimony.
In making the determination required by this section, the court shall consider
the age of the minor, the relationship between the minor and the defendant or
defendants, any handicap or disability of the minor, and the nature of the acts
charged. The minor's refusal to testify shall not alone constitute sufficient evi-
The statute contains safeguards to prevent the indiscriminate and
arbitrary use of CCTV testimony. But despite the recognized need to
protect child victims, and the care with which the statute was
drafted, the use of CCTV raises substantial constitutional issues.
Courts have traditionally held that a face-to-face meeting is an es-
sential element of a defendant's right to confront witnesses. 0 Some
commentators argue that CCTV use may violate a defendant's due
process rights.31 Nevertheless, the state's substantial and compelling
need to protect child sexual abuse victims must be balanced against
the constitutional rights of a defendant. These two interests need not
be mutually exclusive. This Comment explores these issues, and con-
cludes that CCTV does not significantly impair a defendant's rights,
and therefore, such use is constitutionally permissible.
THE CONFRONTATION CLAUSE
The sixth amendment of the Constitution guarantees criminal de-
fendants the right to confront adverse witnesses.32 This requirement
is binding upon the states through the fourteenth amendment.3 3 His-
torically, the Confrontation Clause's primary objective seemed to be
to prevent the use of ex parte affadavits and depositions as the sole
evidence in criminal trials.34 Legal commentators have suggested
that the Confrontation Clause arose in response to the abuses of the
trial of Sir Walter Raleigh. 5 Raleigh was executed for treason fol-
lowing a trial conviction based solely upon ex parte affadavits3 The
government failed to produce witnesses against Raleigh, nor was he
allowed to call witnesses in his own behalf.37 Minimally, the Con-
frontation Clause was designed to provide cross-examination and
personal examination of witnesses in all criminal proceedings. 8
Modernly, confrontation generally serves two basic functions: 1) to
permit defendants to cross-examine adverse witnesses,3 9 and 2) to
permit juries to determine witnesses' credibility by their demeanor
dence that the special procedure described in this section is necessary in order
to obtain the minor's testimony.
Id. § 1347(b)(2).
30. See infra notes 47-78 and accompanying text.
31. See infra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
32. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI provides, in part: "In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall enjoy the right. . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him ....
33. Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 406 (1965).
34. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 242 (1895).
35. See F. HELLER, THE SIXTH AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 104-05 (1951). But see California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 176-79
(1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("Heller's approach, resting as it does essentially on as-
sertion, is . . . [not] . . . persuasive as a historical reading.").
36. Parker, supra note 10, at 687 n.219.
37. Id.
38. See Mattox, 156 U.S. at 244.
39. Pointer, 380 U.S. at 404.
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during testimony. 40 Although the rights of confrontation and cross-
examination are generally considered fundamental to a fair trial,41
they are not absolute rights.42 For example, in Mattox v. United
States,43 the defendant was convicted of murder. His conviction was
overturned and the case rem anded for a new trial. The second trial
resulted in a hung jury and a third trial was ordered. At the third
trial Mattox was convicted largely on the prior testimony of two wit-
nesses who had subsequently died. Mattox challenged the use of the
prior testimony, claiming it should not have been admitted because
he was unable to confront the witnesses. The Supreme Court re-
jected this challenge, in part because Mattox had an opportunity to
confront the witnesses at the first trial. The Court noted:
[G]eneral rules [of law] of this kind, however beneficent in their operation
and valuable to the accused, must occasionally give way to considerations of
public policy and the necessities of the case ....
A technical adherence to the letter of a constitutional provision may occa-
sionally be carried farther than is necessary to the just protection of the
accused, and farther than the safety of the public will warrant.",
Following Mattox, considerations of public policy and necessity
may be sufficient to qualify a constitutional right in appropriate cir-
cumstances. Indeed, dying declarations45 are admissible into evi-
40. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243. In Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 416-19
(1965), the Court reaffirmed the dual purpose of the Confrontation Clause, citing Mat-
tox and Pointer.
41. See Pointer, 380 U.S. at 405.
42. As applied by the Supreme Court, the confrontation right is not an absolute
right; nor does it have an unqualified scope. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 63 (1980)
(To give confrontation an unqualified scope "would abrogate virtually every hearsay ex-
ception."). Unconditionally worded constitutional rights are generally applied in a practi-
cal, rather than strict, manner. For example, in Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court,
457 U.S. 596, 606 (1981), the Supreme Court stated: "Although the right of access to
criminal trials is of constitutional stature, it is not absolute." The Court had earlier held,
in Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951), that the first amendment rule that
Congress make no law abridging free speech "is not an unlimited, unqualified right, but
... must, on occasion, be subordinated to other values and considerations." Similarly,
the confrontation right has not been strictly applied. See, e.g., Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S.
56, 64 (1980) (citing Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 295 (1973) (the confronta-
tion right is subject to balancing with other interests)); Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S.
427, 430-32 (1972) (the denial of confrontation may be harmless error); Mattox v.
United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1875) (rules such as the confrontation right occasion-
ally may have to give way to public policy considerations and necessity); United States v.
Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346, 1357-59 (8th Cir. 1976) (the confrontation right can be waived
in various ways).
43. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
44. Id. at 243.
45. In Mattox, the Court noted:
[T]here could be nothing more directly contrary to the letter of the [confronta-
dence, and certain other hearsay testimony46 may survive challenges
based upon a defendant's confrontation rights, even though the de-
clarant is not present in the courtroom and is not subject to cross-
examination.
THE CCTV-CONFRONTATION CLAUSE CONFLICT
Although the use of CCTV as a means of transmitting testimony
allows defendants ample opportunity for cross-examination, its use
may still interfere with the right of confrontation. Several cases indi-
cate that the physical presence of adverse witnesses in the courtroom
is an essential part of the defendant's sixth amendment rights.47 The
first case to espouse a face-to-face requirement was Mattox v.
United States.48 According to Mattox, the accused should have the
opportunity to compel the witness "to stand face to face with the
jury in order that they may look at him, and judge by his demeanor
upon the stand and the manner in which he gives his testimony
whether he is worthy of belief."49 Although the Court held that the
opportunity for face-to-face confrontation was not absolute, other
early confrontation cases commonly employed similar language."0
A consideration of the technological context in which these cases
tion] provision in question than the admission of dying declarations. They are
rarely made in the presence of the accused; they are made without any oppor-
tunity for examination or cross-examination; nor is the witness brought face to
face with the jury; yet from time immemorial they have been treated as compe-
tent testimony, and no one would have the hardihood at this day to question
their admissibility.
Id. at 243-44.
46. The Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) contain 24 exceptions to the hearsay
rule that can be invoked regardless of whether the declarant is available for cross-exami-
nation. These exceptions include present sense impressions, recorded recollections,
records of regularly conducted activity, and public records and reports. See FED. R. EVID.
803. There are five additional exceptions in the FRE that can be used only if the declar-
ant is unavailable. These include former testimony and statements against interests. See
FED. R. EvID. 804. Many states have enacted rules of evidence similar to the FRE. See,
e.g., OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §§ 2803-2804 (1980); CAL. EVID. CODE § 1228 (West
Supp. 1986).
47. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237 (1875); United States v. Benfield, 593
F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979); Herbert v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal.
Rptr. 850 (1981).
48. 156 U.S. 237 (1895).
49. Id. at 242-43, cited with approval in Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
295 (1973).
50. See, e.g., Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 106 (1934) ("[T]he privilege
to confront one's accusers and cross-examine them face to face ...."); Dowdell v.
United States, 221 U.S. 325, 330 (1911) ("[O]nly such witnesses as meet him face to
face at the trial . . . ."); Kirby v. United States, 174 U.S. 47, 55 (1899) ("[W]itness
upon whom he can look while being tried ...."). In Snyder, however, Justice
Cardozo recognized limitations on the rights of confrontation, stating that "the privilege
of confrontation [has not] at any time been without recognized exceptions .. . .The
exceptions are not even static, but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no
material departure from the reason of the general rule." Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107.
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were decided may diminish the impact of the physical presence re-
quirement. All of these cases were decided prior to 1935. The courts
could not have conceived of an alternative to the witness' physical
presence that would substantially comply with the purposes of the
Confrontation Clause. The face-to-face requirement, therefore, was
the only available means to protect the confrontation rights of the
accused.
In 1979 the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed the requirement of a face-
to-face meeting between an adverse witness and the accused. In
United States v. Benfield,5 1 the defendant was convicted for mis-
prison of felony for his failure to report the kidnapping of a woman.
A psychiatrist testified that the victim could not endure the court
procedure, and the trial court permitted the prosecution to videotape
her deposition in her hospital room; she was deceived into believing
that the defendant was not present. Although the defendant was not
in the room, he was allowed to observe the proceedings on a monitor,
and was provided with a buzzer as a means to halt the proceedings
and confer with counsel. The court held that Benfield's confrontation
rights were violated by the admission of the deposition into evidence,
stating:
Normally the right of confrontation includes a face-to-face meeting at trial
at which time cross-examination takes place .... While some recent cases
use other language, none denies that confrontation required a face-to-face
meeting in 1791 and none lessens the force of the sixth amendment ....
Most believe that in some undefined but real way recollection, veracity, and
communication are influenced by face-to-face challenge."
In Herbert v. Superior Court,53 decided before the enactment of
Penal Code section 1347, a California appellate court used similar
"face-to-face" language.54 In Herbert, the defendant was prosecuted
for child sexual abuse; the child witness "was disturbed by the num-
ber of people in the courtroom and in particular with the presence of
the defendant." 55 The trial judge ordered that the defendant and
witness be seated in such a manner that they could hear but not see
each other. The defendant was required to raise his hand if he could
not hear or wanted to confer with counsel. The California Court of
51. 593 F.2d 815 (8th Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 821.
53. 117 Cal. App. 3d 661, 172 Cal. Rptr. 850 (1981).
54. Section 1347 was approved by the Governor on May 18, 1985, was filed with
the Secretary of State on May 20, 1985, and went into effect immediately. See 1985 Cal.
Stat. c. 43, p. 1.
55. Herbert, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 664, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 853 (quoting the trial
record).
Appeal found this arrangement abridged the defendant's confronta-
tion rights, holding that a face-to-face meeting between the witness
and defendant was required.56 The Herbert court reasoned that:
The historical concept of the right of confrontation has included the right to
see one's accuser face-to-face, thereby giving the fact-finder the opportunity
of weighing the demeanor of the accused [sic] when forced to make his or
her accusation before the one person who knows if the witness is truthful. A
witness' reluctance to face the accused may be the product of fabrication
rather than fear or embarrassment.5'
Despite the "face-to-face" language, these cases differ in nature
from cases where CCTV is used to present testimony in accordance
with Penal Code section 1347. Benfield involved a deposition where
the jury was not present to observe the actual testimony and the
court was concerned that the witness was deceived into believing that
the defendant was not present.5 8 The Benfield court also recognized
the possibility of confrontation right exceptions, stating: "What cur-
tailment or diminishment might be constitutionally permissible de-
pends on the factual context of each case, including the defendant's
conduct . . . .Any exception should be narrow in scope and based
on necessity or waiver." 59 Benfield, therefore, must not be construed
to require a face-to-face meeting as a matter of constitutional man-
date; the lack of a face-to-face meeting was deemed unjustified
solely upon the unique facts of the case.
The Benfield court intimated that innovations such as CCTV testi-
mony might be constitutionally permissible, stating:
Today's decision should not be regarded as prohibiting the development of
electronic video technology in litigation. Where the parties agree to a given
procedure or where the procedure more nearly approximates the traditional
courtroom setting, our approval might be forthcoming.
60
The Herbert scenario is also distinguishable from situations where
CCTV testimony is used under section 1347. The Herbert court may
have been influenced by the unique facts of the case. For example,
the record did not show that the child's condition required the use of
a blocked seating arrangement, or that the defendant intimidated the
child. The witness was not under oath, and neither the defense nor
the prosecution requested the unusual seating arrangement." In a
typical section 1347 scenario, CCTV use must be necessary, it must
56. Id. at 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 860. But see State v. Strable, 313 N.W.2d 497
(Iowa 1981) (upholding a similar procedure).
57. Herbert, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 671, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 860.
58. The court noted that "the witness was apparently unaware that her testimony
was being monitored by the defendant. . .[and because] the accuracy of her perception
was crucial to the Government's case. . . [t]he partial confrontation allowed was inade-
quate to test those features of her testimony." Benfield, 593 F.2d at 822.
59. Id. at 821.
60. Id.
61. Herbert, 117 Cal. App. 3d at 670-71, 172 Cal. Rptr. at 859-60.
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be requested by the prosecutor or the court, and the child must be
under oath. Thus, although the Herbert decision employs the lan-
guage of a face-to-face requirement, its holding is of limited
applicability.
The California Second District Court of Appeals has also indi-
cated that a face-to-face meeting may be constitutionally required.
In Hochheiser v. Superior Court,2 the court issued a writ of prohi-
bition restraining the trial court from enforcing its order allowing
the use of CCTV for taking the testimony of a child victim in a
sexual abuse case. In its decision, made prior to the enactment of
section 1347, the court recognized some of the constitutional con-
cerns raised by CCTV testimony and stated in a footnote: "It would
appear from a careful reading of the cases that physical confronta-
tion is an element of Sixth Amendment guarantees. ' 63 Despite this
language, the court failed to rule on the constitutional issues, but
disallowed the procedure on the narrow grounds that it was not stat-
utorily authorized.64
A number of courts, however, have rejected a strict face-to-face
requirement. In Kansas City v. McCoy,6 5 the Missouri Supreme
Court indicated that a witness' physical presence in the courtroom is
not constitutionally required. In McCoy, the defendant had been
tried and convicted for the possession of marijuana, a violation of a
municipal regulation. The trial court allowed an expert witness to
testify via CCTV. The state supreme court ruled that this testimony
was properly admitted and did not violate the defendant's confronta-
tion rights. The court noted that although the witness was not physi-
cally present in the courtroom, "[h]is image and voice were there
.. . for the defendant to see and hear and, by the same means, si-
multaneously for him to be seen and heard by the witness." 6
Under Penal Code section 1347, CCTV will be used to convey the
testimony of the main complaining witness when the defendant is
facing serious criminal charges. In these respects, McCoy cannot be
considered strong authority for the constitutionality of CCTV use
62. 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273 (1984).
63. Id. at 786 n.2, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278 n.2.
64. Id. at 794, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 284. The court noted that "[s]uch a major step
should be taken, 'if at all, only upon the considered judgment of the Legislature.'" Id. at
794 (quoting Reynolds v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. 3d 834, 837, 528 P.2d 45, 46, 117 Cal.
Rptr. 437, 438 (1974)).
65. 525 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1975).
66. Id. at 339.
under the statute.6 7 Indeed, the Benfield court noted, "Among the
more disturbing aspects of the [McCoy] decision is that there was no
showing of extraordinary circumstances necessitating reliance on the
procedure." 68
A New Jersey case, State v. Sheppard, also rejected the face-to-
face rationale and approved the use of CCTV in a child sexual abuse
case.69 In Sheppard, the prosecution moved to use CCTV to convey
the child victim's testimony. The court granted the motion and out-
lined the procedures to be followed. The system to be used was a
one-way-dosed-circuit television system. The child was to be unable
to seei r hear anything in the courtroom, including the defendant.
The defense and prosecuting attorneys were to be present in the
room with the child during the examination and cross-examination.
70
Although these procedures differ significantly from the procedures
required by section 1347, the New Jersey court held that the proce-
dures would adequately protect the defendant's confrontation
rights.7
1
Section 1347 requires the defendant's image to be broadcast con-
temporaneously to the child during his or her testimony.7 2 This pro-
vides greater confrontation than a one-way system. Section 1347 is
slightly more troubling by its requirement that the attorneys elicit
the testimony from the courtroom73 rather than from the testimonial
room, 74 although this method still allows adequate cross-examina-
tion, which is the core of confrontation rights.
75
67. The McCoy holding was narrowly confined to one expert's testimony in a case
involving the violation of a municipal ordinance. See id.
68. Benfield, 593 F.2d at 822 n.1 1; see also Hochheiser v. Superior Court, 161
Cal. App. 3d at 783 n.l, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 276-77 n.1 (agreeing with the Benfield court's
criticism).
69, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law. Div. 1984).
70. Id. at 442, 484 A.2d at 1349. In contrast, section 1347 requires that the "de-
fendant's image shall be transmitted live to the witness via two-way contemporaneous
closed-circuit television." See CAL PENAL CODE § 1347(h) (West Supp. 1986).
71. 197 N.J. Super. at 432-35, 484 A.2d at 1342-43.
72. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(h) (West Supp. 1986).
73. Id.
74. It has been noted that some "attorneys expressed reservations about their
ability [to adequately] cross-examine witnesses from whom they were physically sepa-
rated." G. COLEMAN, THE IMPACT OF VIDEO USE ON COURT FUNCTION: A SUMMARY OF
CURRENT RESEARCH AND PRACTICE 18 (1977) (footnote omitted). One defense attorney
stated, "I think taking the lawyer out of the picture is . . . not fair. . . . The observa-
tion of the attorney would be less if he's watching it through a camera." Interview with
Ed Applebaum, defense attorney, in San Diego, California (Oct. 12, 1985). These criti-
cisms, however, may be the result of a lack of familiarity with the techniques of cross-
examination via CCTV, rather than an inherent limitation in the procedure itself.
75. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. at 406-07 ("[A] major reason underlying
the constitutional confrontation rule is to give a defendant charged with a crime an op-
portunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him."); Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123, 136 (1968) (emphasizing that the error arose because "the declarant does not
testify and cannot be tested by cross-examination"). But see, e.g., California v. Green,
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Limits on the Right to Cross-Examine
The right to cross-examination is not unlimited. Traditionally,
trial judges are given wide discretion to relieve a witness from ner-
vousness or fear.76 The Supreme Court has recently reafflirmed that
cross-examination is "[s]ubject always to the broad discretion of a
trial judge to preclude repetitive and unduly harassing interroga-
tion."'  CCTV does not restrict cross-examination, it merely alters
the procedure by which it is traditionally performed. As the Shep-
pard court noted: "[T] here is, in fact, no curtailment of cross-exami-
nation, only a restriction upon the means of transmitting questions
and answers. 17 8 Therefore, it is unlikely that CCTV testimony will
be found unconstitutional on the grounds that it unduly interferes
with cross-examination.
To summarize, the main purposes of a physical presence require-
ment are to provide the defendant with an opportunity for cross-ex-
amination, 9 which helps elicit more truthful testimony, and to allow
the fact-finder an opportunity to adequately judge the demeanor of
the witness.8 0 The use of CCTV allows full and adequate cross-ex-
amination. Face-to-face confrontation, however, may diminish,
rather than enhance the prospect of obtaining the truth when the
victims are young and extremely vulnerable. 81 By reducing the
399 U.S. 149, 173 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring) ("If confrontation is to be equated
with the right to cross examine, it would transplant the ganglia of hearsay rules and their
exceptions into the body of constitutional protections.").
76. See Alford v. United States, 282 U.S. 687, 694 (1931). (suggesting that the
court has a duty to protect a witness "from questions which go beyond the bounds of
proper cross-examination merely to harass, annoy or humiliate him").
77. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 316 (1974).
78. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. at 435, 484 A.2d at 1344.
79. As Professor Wigmore explained:
The main and essential purpose of confrontation is to secure for the opponent
the opportunity of cross-examination. The opponent demands confrontation,
not for the idle purpose of gazing upon the witness, or of being gazed upon by
him, but for the purpose of cross-examination, which cannot be had except by
the direct and personal putting of the questions and obtaining immediate an-
swers. That this is the true and essential significance of confrontation is clear.
5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1395 (Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974); see also California v.
Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1969).
80. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1969); Mattox v. United States,
156 U.S. 237, 242-43 (1895).
81. See Note, Parent-Child Incest: Proof at Trial Without Testimony by the Vic-
tim, 15 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 131, 137 (1981); Note, A Comprehensive Approach to Child
Hearsay Statements in Sex Abuse Cases, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1745, 1751-52 (1983); see
also 1985 Cal. Stat. c. 1174, § 1, p.2 ("The Legislature finds that some researchers
believe that traditional courtroom settings intimidate child witnesses and thus may hin-
der the truth-gathering process.").
trauma experienced by child witnesses during testimony, CCTV can
actually enhance the truth-eliciting function of confrontation, while
affording the child some protection against further psychological or
emotional harm.
If the objective in requiring a face-to-face meeting between the
witness and the accused is to intimidate the witness by the presence
of the defendant, those demanding the witness' physical presence
will have succeeded in transforming the right of confrontation into a
right of intimidation. This cannot be what the framers of the Consti-
tution had in mind, since courts have long held that the right of
confrontation is waived through intimidation."2 For example, the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that the grand jury testi-
mony of an unavailable witness was properly admitted at the trial,
where the defendant's intimidation caused the witness to refuse to
testify.8 3 In United States v. Carlson, the Eighth Circuit found that
under these circumstances the defendant's confrontation rights were
not violated, even though the defendant never had an opportunity to
cross-examine the witness.84 Where CCTV can adequately convey
the demeanor of the witness, no reason exists to find the procedures
prescribed by section 1347 constitutionally impermissible, despite the
lack of the witness' physical presence in the courtroom.
DEMEANOR
In California v. Green,85 the Supreme Court indicated that de-
meanor evidence is an important element of sixth amendment rights.
Confrontation "permits the jury that is to decide the defendant's fate
to observe the demeanor of the witness in making his statement, thus
aiding the jury in assessing his credibility." 86 There is some question
about the ability of CCTV to accurately convey demeanor evi-
dence.87 This raises confrontation and due process concerns.
82. See United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
431 U.S. 914 (1977); see also United States v. Balano, 618 F.2d 624, 629 (10th Cir.
1979) ("[C]oercion can constitute voluntary waiver of the right of confrontation.");
Black v. Woods, 651 F.2d 528, 531 (8th Cir. 1981) (The accused "forfeited his confron-
tation right by a pattern of conduct that resulted in [the witness'] fear . . ").
83. United States v. Carlson, 547 F.2d 1346 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431
U.S. 914 (1977).
84. Id.
85. 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
86. Id. at 158.
87. See Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d 777, 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. 273, 278 (1984);
Comment, The Criminal Videotape Trial: Serious Constitutional Questions, 55 OR. L.
REV. 567 (1976). But see Note, Video-Tape Trials: A Practical Evaluation and a Legal
Analysis, 26 STAN. L. REV. 619 (1974) ("[M]ost comments suggest that video tape ade-
quately transmits the demeanor of the witness and the dramatic components of his
testimony.").
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Demeanor and Confrontation
CCTV may distort demeanor evidence through the camera angle
chosen, the scope of the image, the lighting, and various other pro-
duction techniques.88 The camera unintentionally "becomes the ju-
ror's eyes, selecting and commenting upon what is seen." 89 Although
these concerns are valid, the effects can be controlled with proper
safeguards on the procedures and equipment to be employed. Section
1347 does not enumerate specific safeguards, but generally provides:
"[T]he equipment available for use of two-way closed-circuit televi-
sion [s]hould accurately communicate the image and demeanor of
the minor to the judge, jury, defendant or defendants, and attor-
neys."90 The procedural problems are not insurmountable. The
mechanics may be determined, by either the trial judge or stipula-
tion, prior to taking the child's testimony. The camera can be placed
at a height and distance that approximates the jurors normal view of
the witness stand.91 With proper planning, the effects of CCTV on
demeanor evidence can be minimized. 2
The ability to accurately portray the witness' demeanor on televi-
sion is a primary concern-the subtle nuances of nonverbal commu-
nication which aid in the jurors' assessment of witness credibility
may be lost in the televising process. 3 Empirical studies, case law,
and commentators, however, tend to discount the effects of television
on demeanor evidence. 4 For example, a series of studies conducted
88. See generally G. MILLERSON, THE TECHNIQUE OF LIGHTING FOR TELEVISION
AND MOTION PICTURES 47 (1972) ("Composition, camera angle, light direction, colour
renderings, will all effect the viewer's impressions and attitudes to what he sees in the
picture."); H. BETI'INGER, TELEVISION TECHNIQUES 67 (Cornburg rev. ed. 1955)
("[M]erely by the choice of camera angles it is possible (a) to build a subject up; (b) to
present it in a normal 'eye-to-eye' manner; or (c) to play it down.").
89. Hochheiser, 161 Cal. App. 3d at 786, 208 Cal. Rptr. at 278; see also G.
MILLERSON, supra note 88, at 198.
90. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(b)(3) (West Supp. 1986).
91. In the Sheppard case, the court attached to the decision allowing CCTV testi-
mony an appendix fully outlining the procedures to be employed, including the size of the
television monitors to be viewed by the defendant, jury, judge and public. See State v.
Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
92. The California statute affords the defendant further protection by requiring
the testimony to be recorded on video-tape. The videotape may then be used during ap-
pellate review to determine whether any procedural techniques subjected the defendant
to prejudice. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(d)(5) (West Supp. 1986).
93. "The medium cannot capture the total psychological and physical essence of a
witness-persuasiveness, credibility, hesitancy, and forcefulness are indicated through
arm, hand, or eye movements or other bodily changes ...." Brakel, Video-tape in Trial
Proceedings: A Technological Obsession?, 61 A.B.A.J. 956, 957 (1975).
94. See People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1974); State
by Gerald Miller and Norman Fontes concerning the effects of
videotape evidence on juror perceptions found that "there is no evi-
dence to suggest that the use of videotape exerts any deleterious ef-
fects on the juror responses studied . . . ." The authors concluded
that "[t]he use of videotape in the courtroom to present witness tes-
timony does not significantly affect juror judgments of the veracity
of the testimony presented."9 6
A number of appellate decisions are in accord. For example, in a
California case, People v. Moran,97 the videotape of a witness' pre-
liminary hearing testimony was introduced at trial. The defendant
argued that the medium failed to provide adequate demeanor evi-
dence, resulting in a denial of his confrontation rights. The Moran
court rejected the argument, stating: "Conceding that testimony
through a television set differs from live testimony, the process does
not significantly affect the flow of information to the jury. Videotape
is sufficiently similar to live testimony to permit the jury to properly
perform its function."9 8 The New Jersey court in State v. Shep-
pard,99 also rejected this challenge, recognizing that "a videotaped
presentation has the capacity to present clear, accurate, and eviden-
tially appropriate transmissions of images and sound to defendant,
the judge, the jury, and the public." 00
Although imperfect, CCTV testimony is capable of accurately
conveying the demeanor of the witness, which aids the jury in assess-
ing witness credibility.110 One difference between CCTV testimony
and live testimony actually may aid rather than hinder the defend-
ant. Arguably, a "live" appearance by a child-victim can have sub-
stantially greater emotional impact on the jury than a video image;
in this case, CCTV testimony can only work in favor of the defend-
ant. Even without this potential advantage to the defendant, the dif-
ferences are not so significant as to render a statute, such as Penal
Code section 1347, constitutionally infirm.
v. Sheppard, 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984); G.
MILLER & N. FONTES, VIDEOTAPE ON TRIAL-A VIEW FROM THE JURY Box (1979);
Ryan & Cassan, Television Evidence in Court, 122 AM. J. PSYCH. 655 (1965) ("States of
emotion, powers of judgment, quality of attention, memory capacity and general conduct
can be directly observed by the jury.").
95. G. MILLER & N. FONTES, supra note 94, at 207.
96. Id. at 212. "[T]he two studies indicate that accuracy in detecting deception
was not significantly affected by the mode of presenting testimony; in fact, we stressed
that high levels of nonverbal information may actually hamper attempts to assess witness
veracity. By far the most interesting result was the relatively low level otaccuracy across
all presentation modes, a finding which suggests that jurors are probably not notably
effective in determining whether a witness is testifying truthfully." Id. at 205.
97. 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1974).
98. Id. at 410, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
99. 197 N.J. Super. 411, 484 A.2d 1330 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984).
100. Id. at 431, 484 A.2d at 1342.
101. Green, 399 U.S. at 158.
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CCTV AND DUE PROCESS
Procedural changes such as CCTV may affect a defendant's right
to due process. 102 The Due Process Clause of the Constitution re-
quires a fair trial. 10 3 A showing of actual bias or prejudice generally
is required before a procedure will be deemed to violate due pro-
cess.104 Although fairness does not require a perfect trial,10 5 if the
procedure is inherently unfair, a showing of actual bias may not be
necessary. 0 6
The California court in People v. Moran'07 considered whether the
use of videotape is inherently unfair. In Moran, the videotape of a
witness' testimony at a preliminary hearing was introduced at trial.
On appeal, the defendant argued that the "technical distortions of
the medium" and "its failure to accurately transmit the demeanor of
the witness"'' 0 8 violated his due process rights. The court, while con-
ceding the televised testimony differed somewhat from live testi-
mony, noted that the "advantages and disadvantages of the 'filtering'
effect of the medium fall equally on both sides."'1 9 The court con-
cluded: "Therefore, its use is 'fair' and there is no inherent unfair-
ness . . . . Fair new procedures that facilitate proper factfinding are
allowable, although not traditional." 1 0 Given the similarity of
CCTV to videotape, this finding logically should be extended to
CCTV testimony. Thus, the capacity of CCTV to accurately trans-
mit the demeanor and other components of the witnesses' testimony
would seem to satisfy due process requirements.
102. The fourteenth amendment of the Constitution provides, in part: "[No] State
[shall] deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV.
103. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 543 (1965).
104. Id. at 542; see In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955).
105. Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604, 619 (1952) ("A defendant is entitled
to a fair trial but not a perfect one.").
106. Estes, 381 U.S. at 542 ("[A]t times a procedure employed by the State in-
volves such a probability that prejudice will result that it is deemed inherently lacking in
due process.").
107. 39 Cal. App. 3d 398, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413 (1974).
108. Id. at 410, 114 Cal. Rptr. at 420.
109. Id.
110. Id. (citations omitted).
BALANCING THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS AND THE PROTECTION OF
THE CHILD
In order to protect children from harm, the state has traditionally
acted as a "super-parent" under the doctrine of parens patriae.11,1
Within this context, the California Legislature enacted section 1347
to protect child victims of sexual abuse from the additional trauma
inflicted by testifying in open court. In enacting this statute, the leg-
islature has carefully considered the state's interest in protecting
child victim witnesses. 112 Absent a compelling interest, the state can-
not justify a limitation on a defendant's constitutional rights. Altera-
tion of a defendant's rights must be carefully scrutinized and bal-
anced against the purpose for the change to determine if the benefits
outweigh the harm.
113
The Supreme Court has recognized that the scope of constitu-
tional protections "must occasionally give way to considerations of
public.policy and the necessities of the case."1 "4 In doing so, the
Court noted that "[a] technical adherence to the letter of a constitu-
tional provision may occasionally be carried farther than is necessary
to the just protection of the accused, and farther than the safety of
the public will warrant."115 The Confrontation Clause affords the de-
fendant substantial constitutional protections and cannot be tam-
pered with lightly. Nevertheless, the plight of child sexual abuse vic-
tims may well justify some modification of these rights.
The Supreme Court has recognized the compelling nature of a
state's interest in "safeguarding the physical and psychological well-
being of a minor."11 6 This interest can be served by allowing CCTV
I 11. For an explanation of parens patriae, see R. MNOOKIN, CHILD, FAMILY AND
STATE: PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CHILDREN AND THE LAW 84 (1978). Parens pa-
triae originates from the English common law where the King had a royal perogative to
act as guardian to persons with legal disabilities such as infants, idiots and lunatics. In
the United States, the phrase traditionally refers to the sovereign role of the state as the
guardian of persons under legal disability. See State v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 440 F.2d
1079, 1089 (2d Cir. 1971).
112. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1347(a) provides:
It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this section to provide the court
with discretion to employ unusual court procedures to protect the rights of a
child witness, the rights of the defendant, and the integrity of the judicial pro-
cess. In exercising its discretion, the court necessarily will be required to bal-
ance the rights of the defendant against the need to protect a child witness and
to preserve the integrity of the court's truth-finding function. This discretion is
intended to be used selectively when the facts and circumstances in the individ-
ual case present compelling evidence of the need to use these unusual
procedures.
See also 1985 Cal. Stat. c. 1174, § 1, p. 1-2.
113. Mattox v. United States, 156 U.S. 237, 243 (1985).
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 607 (1982). The
Court in Globe, however, struck down a state law requiring mandatory closure of the
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testimony under procedures which preserve the defendant's essential
rights. CCTV merely denies the defendant physical face-to-face con-
frontation with the witness. The underlying purposes of confronta-
tion, however, will be satisfied. The child is under oath and subject
to full cross-examination. The child's demeanor is conveyed to the
trier of fact. Furthermore, placing the child in a more relaxed atmo-
sphere may help elicit more reliable evidence. 117 On balance, there-
fore, the statute should be found constitutional.
One additional benefit of CCTV use may accrue to the defend-
ant-the protection of the right to public trial.118 Because the child
can testify from outside the courtroom, it may no longer be neces-
sary to close the courtroom to the public and press as a means of
protecting the child. 119 Thus, CCTV may enhance a sixth amend-
ment right of the defendant, while at the same time protect the child
from further trauma.
CONCLUSION
Justice Cardozo recognized that some limitations may be placed
on confrontation: "The privilege of confrontation [has not] at any
time been without recognized exceptions . . . .The exceptions are
not even static but may be enlarged from time to time if there is no
material departure from the reason of the general rule. '120 The Mat-
tox court acknowledged that "considerations of public policy and the
necessities of the case" may be sufficient to justify limiting the con-
frontation right.121 Surely the protection of these once abused chil-
dren should be sufficient to justify the minor limitations CCTV use
imposes upon confrontation.
courtroom during the testimony of minor victims in criminal sex offense trials. The Court
held that the state's interest did not justify a mandatory closure, but noted that a law
which allows a trial court to determine closure on a case by case basis would ensure
"that the constitutional right of the press and public will not be restricted except where
necessary" and would be permissible. Id. at 609.
117. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
118. The sixth amendment of the Constitution provides, in part: "In all criminal
prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a ... public trial .... " U.S. CoNsT.
amend. VI.
119. CAL. PENAL CODE § 868.7 provides that a closed hearing is permissible if the
witness is a minor who is a victim of a sexual offense and "no alternative procedures
including . . . contemporaneous examination in another place communicated to the
courtroom by means of closed-circuit television are available to avoid the perceived
harm." Id. at § 868.7(a)(1) (effective Jan. 1, 1987) (West 1984).
120. Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 107 (1934).
121. Mattox, 156 U.S. at 243; see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284,
295 (1973) (the confrontation right is subject to balancing with other interests).
Society has a substantial and compelling need to protect child sex-
ual abuse victims from further psychological and emotional harm.
Society also has a compelling need to preserve the rights of defend-
ants. These two needs, however, are not mutually exclusive. They
must be balanced against each other, and their respective weights
determined. Indeed, since CCTV can be used without any substan-
tial infringement of a defendant's rights and because the need to
protect the victimized child witness is overwhelming, the scale must
tip towards the child.
The introduction of technology into the legal arena frequently has
met with resistance, hindered not only by the usual resistance to
change, but also by the precedential nature of our legal system. One
court has observed that "the television camera is a stranger only in
the slower moving apparatus of justice. 122 This does not have to be
the case. California has taken a large step forward with the intro-
duction of this statute, employing a twentieth century solution to a
twentieth century problem. Other states are well advised to follow
this lead. Our children are unable to protect themselves; only
through innovation and perseverance can we begin to combat the
pervasive ill of child sexual abuse.
STEVEN M. ROMANOFF
122. People v. Moran, 39 Cal. App. 398, 411, 114 Cal. Rptr. 413, 420 (1974).
